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Abstract
This paper examines how trade unions shape the volatility of wages
over the business cycle. I present a dynamic stochastic model of the
labor market that integrates two main features: search frictions and trade
unions. Because of search frictions, each job match yields an economic
surplus that is shared by the bargained wage. Therefore, I can decompose
the volatility of wages into two components: the volatility of the match
surplus and the volatility of the worker share of the surplus. Starting
from the unions' objective function, I demonstrate that, under collective
wage bargaining, the worker share is endogenous and countercyclical.
Consequently, when the economy is hit by a shock, the dynamics of the
worker share partially counteract the dynamics of the match surplus and
this mechanism delivers endogenous wage rigidity. The model thus sheds
new insights into two business cycle features: the union wage premium
ﬂuctuates countercyclically, and employment is more cyclically sensitive
but less persistent when wages are collectively bargained.
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1 Introduction
The role of trade unions is to protect the rights and interests of their members
through representation within ﬁrms. In so doing, trade unions negotiate
with employers on behalf of workers for better wages and working conditions.
Therefore, through their direct participation in the wage determination process,
trade unions aﬀect the wage level and shape its volatility. This paper integrates
trade unions into a dynamic search and matching framework that speciﬁes two
important sources of wage volatility: the volatility of the total match surplus
and the volatility of the worker share, which is formally deﬁned as the share of
the total surplus obtained by workers. I study how these two sources of wage
volatility interact over the business cycle to elucidate the cyclical properties of
collectively-bargained wages, labor market tightness, employment, and union
wage premia.
Speciﬁcally, this paper builds on Mortensen and Pissarides' (1994) search
and matching model by introducing trade unions to the model. Although this
theoretical framework accommodates diﬀerent rent-sharing rules, i.e., diﬀerent
wage-setting processes, most of the search and matching literature proposes
an individual Nash bargaining solution. Alternatives have recently been
investigated, often to improve the ability of the model to explain the stylized
facts of the business cycle.1 Within this growing strand of literature, few papers
focus on collective wage bargaining. Yet, collective bargaining coverage remains
high, even though union density has declined overall,2 and because of their direct
participation in wage negotiations, unions necessarily aﬀect not only the level
but also the volatility of wages. Pissarides (1986) ﬁrst integrated trade unions, in
the form of a single monopoly union, into a search and matching framework, and
Delacroix (2006) and Garibaldi and Violante (2005) subsequently extended his
work. These authors model wage determination in the presence of trade unions
and describe the negative impact of the union wage premium on employment.
However, they propose steady state analyses that do not provide insight into
the speciﬁc volatility of collectively bargained wages.
I develop and simulate a model of collective wage bargaining and compare the
labor market dynamics with those characterizing individual wage bargaining. In
so doing, I am able to identify the role of trade unions in shaping the volatility of
labor market variables. The unions' utility function increases in both wages and
employment, and the labor demand embodies the trade-oﬀ faced by unions. I
decompose the mechanism through which unions aﬀects wage dynamics in three
steps. First, I demonstrate that the unions' preferences regarding employment
and wages, deﬁned as the marginal rate of substitution between them, directly
1Shimer (2005) notes that at conventional parameters values, individually Nash bargained
wages are excessively volatile, depressing vacancy creation. Consequently, employment is far
less volatile in the model than in the data. Wage rigidity has been explored as a way to
improve the performance of the model.
2For a recent study on wage bargaining institutions in most European countries, the U.S.,
and Japan, see Du Caju, Gautier, Momferatou, and Ward-Warmedinger (2008). Among other
results, they provide evidence on collective bargaining coverage and establish that this rate
exceeds 80% in most western European countries.
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translate into the worker share of the surplus, i.e., the fraction of the total
match surplus obtained by the workers. Indeed, when unions favor employment,
they lower the worker share to boost the ﬁrms' surplus and vacancy postings.
Conversely, when unions favor wages, they demand a high worker share.
Second, I show that the unions' preferences and therefore the labor share
ﬂuctuate endogenously. When the economy is hit by an adverse productivity
shock, given the higher reactivity of wages compared with employment, the
unions' ﬁrst concern is to avoid a large decrease in the wage rate. Therefore, on
impact, unions prioritize wages over employment and exert upward pressure on
the worker share. In subsequent periods, as the adverse shock propagates into
the economy and as unemployment increases, unions become more employment-
oriented, diminishing the worker share. This second ﬁnding is consistent
with empirical evidence suggesting that the unions' power to raise wages is
reduced when unemployment is high.3 The unions' behavior is therefore entirely
explained by changes in the relative weights given to wages and employment over
the business cycle, and because the cyclical properties of the unions' preferences
directly determine the cyclical properties of the worker share, the worker share
is countercyclical and features little persistence.
Third, the wage equation indicates that wages increase with both the
total match surplus and the labor share. Under collective wage bargaining,
the countercyclical ﬂuctuations in the labor share dampen the procyclical
ﬂuctuations of wages, and this mechanism endogenously generates wage rigidity.
Furthermore, the low persistence in the worker share dynamics, which is
explained by the change in the union's preferences over the business cycle,
translates into high persistence in the wage dynamics. I also investigate the
cyclical properties of the union wage premium. Because the ﬂuctuations in
the labor share represent an additional source of wage volatility for collectively
bargained wages only, I ﬁnd that the union wage premium widens after an
adverse shock. The model therefore provides a theoretical rationale for the
countercyclicality of the union wage premium that has been documented by
several empirical studies. For example, in their book entitled What do unions
do?, Freeman and Medoﬀ (1984) show that unions behave more aggressively
in poor economic times. Their underlying argument diﬀers slightly from the
present argument, as they explain that the countercyclicality of the union wage
premium observed during the depression of the 1920s and 1930s is mainly driven
by the greater capacity of unionized workers to ﬁght employers' eﬀort to reduce
3Using time series data for the Swedish construction sector, Aronsson, Löfgren, and
Wikström (1993) test two models of wage determination: one in which the bargaining power
of the union is constant over time and another one in which the bargaining power develops
with unemployment and labor market characteristics. They ﬁnd evidence that unemployment
tends to decrease the bargaining power of the union. Campbell (1997) empirically conﬁrms
this result. Using U.S. data, he ﬁnds that union wages are more sensitive than nonunion
wages to the unemployment rate. See also Calmfors, Booth, Burda, Checchi, Naylor, and
Visser (2001), Part I, chapter 2.4, for a literature review on the negative relation between
unemployment and union membership, which is based on the argument that in times of high
and rising unemployment, unions are less able to press demands and obtain advantages for
members.
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wages when market conditions are unfavorable. Based on an empirical study of
the union wage premium in the U.S. over the 1973-2002 period, Blanchﬂower and
Bryson (2004) also ﬁnd that the union wage premium widens during recessions.
Therefore, in this paper, I provide a micro-foundation of the rigidity of
collectively-bargained wages. This rigidity, in turn, ampliﬁes the volatility
of employment and labor market tightness over the business cycle. Using a
calibration that matches the empirical regularities of the U.S., I show that
labor market tightness is twice as volatile in a collective bargaining model than
in an individual bargaining model. Therefore, accounting for collective wage
bargaining greatly increases the performance of the search and matching model
and partially addresses Shimer's (2005) critique that basic search and matching
models are unable to capture the strong procyclicality of labor market tightness.
This improvement is expected to be more substantial in European countries,
where the union coverage often exceeds 80%, than in the U.S., where the union
coverage is currently approximately 10− 15%.
This paper also connects labor market volatility to the degree of co-
ordination in collective wage bargaining. Indeed, the model accommodates
a wage negotiation process that takes place at both the ﬁrm level and the
economy level. Under collective wage-bargaining at the ﬁrm level, when a
multitude of unions bargain with a continuum of ﬁrms, each union is too small
to inﬂuence the market and, in particular, the vacancy ﬁlling rate. On the
opposite, when wages are collectively bargained at the economy level, between
a representative ﬁrm and a representative union, the representative union
internalizes the positive wage eﬀect on the vacancy-ﬁlling rate and is therefore
more favorable towards pushing for higher wages. The countercyclicality of
the worker share is dampened and this mechanism therefore suggests that wage
rigidity decreases with the degree of centralization in collective wage bargaining.
Finally, this paper also addresses a large literature on the insider-outsider
theory of wages and unemployment.4 This approach places market power into
the hands of employed workers (insiders). In the present setting, employed
workers under collective bargaining derive their market power from both the
presence of search frictions and union representation. If unions were to be run
by insiders only, the unions' utility would be a sole function of wages, and unions
would raise wages to their maximum, similarly to an individual wage bargaining.
As soon as unions put some weight on outsiders, employment enters the unions'
utility function which brings unions to trade between wages and employment and
to curb their wage demands. When the labor market is tight, the proportion
of insiders to outsiders in unions is high, and insiders gain ability to impose
their interests to the detriment of outsiders who suﬀer from a low job ﬁnding
rate. The opposite occurs when the labor market is slack. Moreover, the model
predicts that, when allowing unions to factor in the negative consequences of
their wage demands on future employment opportunities and future worker
surpluses, unions make more aggressive wage demands and the ﬂuctuations in
4See for example Lindbeck and Snower (1986), Lindbeck and Snower (1989) and Blanchard
and Summers (1986).
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the worker share are dampened.
The present model provides a convenient framework for analyzing the role
of unions in shaping the volatility of wages and employment. In this sense,
my paper is related to a small literature that studies the business cycle in
settings that depart from perfect competition in the labor market. Mattesini
and Rossi (2009) and Faia and Rossi (2013) analyze optimal monetary policy
rules in a unionized or dual labor market economy, whereas Zanetti (2007)
develops a DSGE model with the addition of a unionized labor market to
analyze the macroeconomic responses to demand and supply shocks. In these
three papers, unions dampen wage dynamics because union wages are assumed
to depend on either exogenous union reservation wages or past wages, two
assumptions that creates ad hoc wage rigidity.5 These assumptions and features
are unsatisfactory if one wishes to identify the sources of union wage rigidity.
Moreover, none of these studies integrates trade unions into a search and
matching framework, which is yet a natural way of modeling the objective
function for unions, from which the union wage and the endogenous worker
share is derived, and allows for a clear comparison between individual and
collective wage bargaining. Furthermore, the search and matching framework
enables me to unveil a new mechanism of wage rigidity for collectively bargained
wages and to give a novel perspective on the behavior of trade unions over
the business cycle and on the cyclical properties of employment and labor
market tightness. Similar to this paper, Alvarez and Shimer (2014) and
Krusell and Rudanko (2012) introduce unions into a search model but their
focus diﬀers. Alvarez and Shimer (2014) analyze how unions, by imposing a
minimum wage, aﬀect both unemployment and the wage distribution. Krusell
and Rudanko (2012) integrate monopoly unions into a search and matching
framework to document the endogenous rigidity of wages that arises when wages
are collectively bargained. Their analysis focuses on the welfare eﬀect of a
monopoly union, while I mainly study how trade unions aﬀect the volatility of
the labor market, disentangling the diﬀerent channels through which collective
bargaining aﬀects the cyclical properties of wages, labor market tightness and
employment. Moreover, monopoly unions represent a special case of my analysis,
as I allow the union to bargain with ﬁrms regarding wages. This setting enables
me to examine how a change in the union's bargaining process modiﬁes labor
market volatilities.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the collective wage
bargaining and the equilibrium equations. I also provide a comparison of the
wage formation and hiring processes with a standard individual Nash bargaining
setting. Section 3 focuses on the model's properties: the countercyclical
worker share that yields wage rigidity, and the countercyclical union wage
premium. Section 4 quantitatively analyzes the dynamic behavior of the model
for disturbances (productivity shocks). Section 5 concludes.
5In Mattesini and Rossi (2009), union wages are totally acyclical due to the additional
assumption of a Stone-Geary utility function of the union.
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2 The Model
2.1 The Environment
2.1.1 Collective vs. Individual Wage Bargaining
In this paper, I compare the optimality conditions and business cycle features
of the labor market under collective versus individual wage bargaining. In the
benchmark case, characterized by individual wage bargaining, employers and
employees agree on wages through a bilateral Nash bargaining process. In
the case of collective wage bargaining, I assume that unions negotiate wages
with ﬁrms on behalf of their members. The dynamic model that I develop
accommodates both ﬁrm-level and economy-wide wage negotiations. I analyze
individual and collective wage-setting process in isolation and by doing so, I
implicitly assume a perfect segmentation of the labor market, i.e. workers are
divided across a union and a non-union labor market, and barriers prevent free
movement.6
2.1.2 Timing
Time is discrete. At the beginning of each period, the level of aggregate
productivity is revealed and a fraction λ of existing matches exogenously
separate. Next, the matching process occurs. Because of search frictions, a
fraction of unemployed workers and ﬁrms actually form a match during each
period. The number of new matches in period t, mt, is determined through a
matching function that is increasing in both the number of unemployed workers,
ut, and the number of vacancies, vt: mt = σmut
σuvt
1−σu where σm represents
the eﬃciency of the matching process. At the end of the period, production
occurs with a level of employment nt, and salaries wt and unemployment beneﬁts
b are paid. In this framework, ﬁrms react to productivity shocks by adjusting
vacancies and newly employed workers start producing within the hiring period.
The two wage bargaining structures diﬀer in the point in time at which
wages are negotiated. Under individual wage bargaining, by the very nature
of individual processing, wages are negotiated once each ﬁrm-worker pair is
formed. Firms rationally anticipate the outcome of wage negotiations when
they decide upon the number of vacancies to post. Under collective bargaining,
I assume a right-to-manage timing based on a sequence à la Stackelberg, where
unions ﬁrst bargain with ﬁrms over wages and ﬁrms then respond by unilaterally
determining vacancies. This timing contrasts with that adopted in the search
and matching literature, but reﬂects the common practice both in both the
trade union literature and studies incorporating trade unions into search and
6This assumption parallels the labor market segmentation into a unionized primary sector
and a secondary competitive sector presented by MacDonald and Solow (1985). Moreover, in a
model with homogenous workers, the assumption of labor market segmentation is in line with
the sluggishness of the excess coverage rate (Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004)), which indicates
that the division of workers into the union and non-union labor markets can be considered
ﬁxed in the short-run.
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matching frameworks (see Pissarides (1986), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999),
and Delacroix (2006)).
2.1.3 Stocks and Flows
The labor force is homogeneous and normalized to one. The end-of-period
employment nt evolves according to the following dynamics:
nt = 1− ut +mt (1)
whereas the number of unemployed workers at the beginning of period t evolves
as:
ut = 1− (1− λ)nt−1 (2)
2.2 Vacancy Posting Decision under Collective Bargaining
Firms are assumed to be suﬃciently large to ensure that by the law of large
numbers, the fraction of vacancies ﬁlled in each ﬁrm is equal to the vacancy
ﬁlling rate: qt(θt) =
mt
vt
where θt =
vt
ut
represents the labor market tightness.
Aggregate productivity, denoted by zt, follows an AR(1) process. Given that
ﬁrms are identical, I focus on a representative ﬁrm whose output is given by
yt = ztnt. The ﬁrms' costs consist of the wage and the vacancy posting cost (c
per vacancy).
The number of posted vacancies maximizes the proﬁt value function:
max
vt
Ft(nt) = ztnt − wtnt − cvt + EtβFt+1(nt+1)
s.t. nt = (1− λ)nt−1 + qtvt
where β is the discount factor. The ﬁrst-order condition is given by:7
∂Ft
∂vt
= ztqt − wtqt − c+ Etβ ∂Ft+1
∂nt
qt = 0 (3)
Applying the envelope condition to Equation 3 leads to:
∂Ft
∂nt−1
= (1− λ) c
qt
(4)
Plugging Equation (4) into Equation (3), I obtain the job creation equation:
c
qt
= zt − wt + Etβ(1− λ) c
qt+1
(5)
Because the job creation curve obtained under individual wage bargaining is
a standard result in the search and matching literature, I succinctly derive it in
7Note that each individual ﬁrm and worker are too small to inﬂuence the market, so when
they meet, they take the rest of the market as given.
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Appendix A.1 and I show that, with constant returns to scale in the production
function, the job creation curve under collective wage bargaining, (5), is identical
to that obtained under individual wage bargaining. The equation establishes
that ﬁrms post vacancies up to the point at which the cost of posting a vacancy
c times the expected duration of the vacancy 1qt equals the contribution of the
worker to the ﬂow of proﬁt plus the vacancy posting cost that the ﬁrm would
save in t+ 1 if the match does not cease.
2.3 Wage Negotiation under Collective Bargaining
In this section, I focus on the wage bargaining process under collective wage
bargaining, and I compare these optimality conditions with those for individual
wage bargaining derived in Appendix A.2.
At the beginning of each period, unions and ﬁrms bargain over the wage.
Subsequently, the ﬁrms unilaterally decide the number of vacancies to post based
on the wage that has been previously negotiated. This right-to-manage model,
which is in line with Nickell (1982) and Nickell and Andrews (1983), nests the
special case of monopoly unions but allows for a more general assessment of
how the unions' bargaining power aﬀects wage volatility.8,9 Note that, in order
to keep as simple a theoretical framework as possible, I do not introduce the
possibility of overlapping contracts and leave the investigation of this issue open
for future research.10
The Nash-bargained wage maximizes the product of the net gain of
agreement for both parties.
2.3.1 Collective Nash-Bargaining
Net gain of agreement for unions. Wt and Ut denote the present values of being
employed and being unemployed at the end of period t, respectively:
Wt = wt + Etβ
[
(1− λ+ λpt+1)Wt+1 + λ(1− pt+1)Ut+1
]
(6)
Ut = b+ Etβ
[
pt+1Wt+1 + (1− pt+1)Ut+1
]
(7)
where pt =
mt
ut
is the job ﬁnding rate.
Unions are concerned with the welfare of their members, who are either
employed or unemployed. At the time of bargaining, 1 − ut workers are
employed, and all these workers will reach the payoﬀ Wt with certainty at the
8See Zanetti (2011), Mattesini and Rossi (2009), and Faia and Rossi (2013) for models
with monopoly unions.
9Right-to-manage bargained wages are not Pareto eﬃcient. Eﬃcient contracts can be
obtained if ﬁrms and unions were to bargain simultaneously over wages and employment, as
shown by Leontief (1946). However, as argued by Calmfors and Horn (1986) and Oswald
(1993), negotiations generally do not include employment explicitly.
10A plausible setting would be to have a Calvo-type staggered wage negotiation and trade
unions that bargain over the duration of the wage contracts. Potentially, depending on the
unions' utility function, such a framework could also generate endogenous wage rigidity.
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end of the period; by contrast, ut workers are unemployed, and a fraction pt
of these workers will form a match and obtain the associated payoﬀ Wt, with
the remaining 1 − pt reaching the level of utility Ut. The unions' utility Ωt is
assumed to be the sum of the utility levels of their members:
Ωt = (1− ut)Wt + ut[ptWt + (1− pt)Ut]
Ωt = nt(Wt − Ut) + Ut (8)
Because all workers would be unemployed if the wage negotiation fails, the
workers' fall back utility is Ut. Hence, the unions' net value of agreement is
nt(Wt−Ut).11 Under the assumptions that workers and ﬁrms are homogenous,
the value of employment for the marginal worker is identical among workers.
Moreover, under constant returns to scale in the production function, the wage
rate is independent of the employment level, and the welfare values Wt and Ut
represent the employment and unemployment values, respectively, of both the
marginal and average worker. Therefore, Wt − Ut can be interpreted as the
average worker's surplus and nt(Wt − Ut) as the total surplus of the workers.
This utilitarian speciﬁcation, in line with MacDonald and Solow (1981) and
Oswald (1982), is common in the trade union literature (see Calmfors (1982),
Sampson (1983), Kidd and Oswald (1987), and Pissarides (1986), among others).
First, this speciﬁcation allows for an immediate comparison of the workers'
objectives across wage bargaining processes. Workers who individually bargain
over their wage seek to maximize their own surplusWt−Ut without considering
how the bargain aﬀects employment. In comparison, when negotiating with
ﬁrms, unions aim at maximizing the sum of the workers' surpluses, nt(Wt−Ut).
Both workers and unions foresee that their demands aﬀect the ﬁrms' hiring
decision. However, the speciﬁc feature of collective bargaining is that when
negotiating wages, unions internalize the employer response to the wage bargain,
as they seek to maximize the individual surplus of a match and the proportion
of workers receiving this surplus. Second, the search and matching framework
provides a natural way to model the workers' fall back utility Ut, which is
not ﬁxed over time but ﬂuctuates with the expected evolution of market
tightness. Third, in contrast with Stone-Geary utility functions, the unions'
objective is directly derived from the union members' preferences. Therefore,
the unions' utility speciﬁcation, as described by Equation (8), allows for political
considerations. Indeed, I will show that employment and wages do not have
ﬁxed weights in the unions' utility function and that, consequently, the relative
importance that unions assign to these two issues endogenously ﬂuctuates over
the business cycle.
Net gain of agreement for ﬁrms. If the collective bargaining process is
successful and if a wage agreement is reached, each ﬁrm obtains an end-of-
period proﬁt Ft, which includes the vacancy ﬁlling costs that are not sunk
11Given that the surplus of unemployed workers is equal to zero, the same net value of
agreement is obtained if the union is assumed to be concerned only with the welfare of the
workers who are employed at the end of the period.
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at the time of the bargaining.12 Moreover, because ﬁrms would not ﬁnd any
nonunion workers to ﬁll vacancies if the bargaining fails, the ﬁrms' fall back
payoﬀ is zero. Therefore, the net gain of agreement for the ﬁrms is equal to Ft.
As I show in Appendix B, the ﬁrms' proﬁt can be written as a function of Jt,
which denotes the ﬁrms' ex-post employment value of both the marginal and
the average match, i.e., once the vacancy ﬁlling costs have been sunk:
Ft = ntJt − cvt
where Jt = zt − wt + Etβ(1− λ)Jt+1.
2.3.2 Wage Equation under Firm-Level Wage Negotiation
I ﬁrst derive the wage equation obtained when wages are collectively negotiated
at each ﬁrm level. Equation (8) shows that the unions' utility depends on both
wages and employment. High wages increase the individual worker's surplus,
but because the job creation curve is downward sloping, high wages also reduce
the ﬁrms' incentive to post vacancies and therefore lower employment: Ωt =
Ωt(wt, nt(wt)) with Ω
′
w > 0, Ω
′
n > 0, and n
′
w < 0. The ﬁrms' labor demand
function therefore embodies the trade-oﬀ faced by unions and constrains the
unions' maximization problem.13 Moreover, when wages are negotiated at the
ﬁrm-level, unions do not internalize the eﬀect of wages on the vacancy-ﬁlling
rate, as each union is too small to inﬂuence the market. Therefore, unions factor
in the negative impact of wages on vacancies, but discard the wage eﬀect on the
vacancy-ﬁlling rate.
max
wt
[nt(Wt − Ut)]ηC [Ft]1−ηC
s.t. job creation curve:
c
qt
= zt − wt + Etβ(1− λ) c
qt+1
where ηC is the union's bargaining power.14
In Table 1, I report two results: i) the equilibrium condition for the worker
share of the total surplus, η˜t, that results from the ﬁrst-order condition; and
ii) the wage curve that derives from this equilibrium condition (see Appendices
12For this reason, the vacancy ﬁlling costs must be taken into account in the expected
proﬁt. Hence, the diﬀerences in the wage equations across wage-setting processes stem from
both the diﬀerence in the level at which the wage bargaining occurs (individualized bargaining
vs. collective bargaining) and the diﬀerence in timing (ex-ante wage bargaining in the union
model vs. ex-post wage bargaining in the non-union model).
13This trade-oﬀ would disappear if the vacancy posting decision was made before the wage
bargaining, and both wage-setting processes would lead to the same equilibrium. Indeed,
if vacancies were posted ex-ante, the hiring decision would be based on the expected, or
promised, wage level. Yet, the union cannot credibly announce that it will moderate the wage
rate to promote hiring. Indeed, once the vacancies have been posted, the union would deviate
from its announcement and push the wage to the highest possible level.
14For an empirical test of this maximization problem, see Dertouzos and Pencavel (1981).
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C.1 and C.3). Moreover, to compare the two wage-setting processes, I indicate
the optimal worker share and the wage curve obtained under individual wage
bargaining (see Appendices A.2 and A.2).15
When wages are individually bargained, the optimality condition states that
the worker share of the total surplus equals the workers' bargaining power. In
contrast, when wages are collectively bargained, the optimal worker share, η˜t,
is equal to the unions' bargaining power, η, multiplied by a second term that is
endogenous and smaller than one. Regarding the wage curve, two comments are
in order. First, the structure of the wage curve is identical across wage-setting
processes, as both bargaining sets are bounded by the same wage levels: zt +
Etβ(1−λ)cθt+1 and b. Indeed, the third term on the right side of Equation (10),
Θt, which indicates how the expected evolution of the worker share aﬀects the
workers' wage, becomes negligible as the model's persistence increases. Second,
because the worker share, η˜t, is endogenous under collective wage bargaining,
the sharing rule does not allocate a constant proportion of the bargaining set
to the worker and the ﬁrm. Consequently, the ﬂuctuations in the wage rate
stem from two distinct sources: the ﬂuctuations of the total surplus and the
ﬂuctuations of the worker share. This crucial result is the focus of Section 3.1.
2.3.3 Wage Equation with Economy-Wide Wage Negotiation
When wage bargaining is co-ordinated through economy-wide agreements,
the collective bargain that takes place between an employer association and
one recognized union translates in our framework into a bargaining process
between a representative ﬁrm and a representative union. Because of the
broad impact of the negotiated wage, the representative union internalizes the
wage eﬀect on both vacancy posting and the vacancy-ﬁlling rate. As a result,
employment is less sensitive to wage changes, as the negative wage eﬀect on
vacancies is partially oﬀset by the positive wage eﬀect on the vacancy-ﬁlling
rate.
The worker share of the total surplus and the wage curve are shown on Table
1.16 Equation (14) shows that the worker share η˜t is less cyclical than in the
case of ﬁrm-level collective bargaining. Section 4.2.2 will compare the impulse
responses to productivity shocks for these two levels of wage bargaining.
3 The Model's Properties
In this section, I illustrate the mechanism through which wage rigidity
endogenously arises under collective wage bargaining. I analyze the degree of
wage rigidity based on how wages ﬂuctuate when the economy experiences a
productivity shock. Because the model's properties are qualitatively similar
15To facilitate the comparison with the case of individual wage bargaining, I express the
worker share of the ex-post total surplus associated with a single worker-ﬁrm match (ex-post
means regardless of the vacancy posting cost).
16See Appendices C.3 and C.2 for the derivations.
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Table 1: Worker Share and Wage Curve
Individual wage bargaining
Wt − Ut
Wt − Ut + Jt
= ηI wt = η
I
[
zt + Etβ(1− λ)cθt+1
]
+ (1− ηI)b
Collective wage bargaining - Firm-level bargaining
Wt − Ut
Wt − Ut + Jt
= η˜t (9) wt = η˜t
[
zt+Etβ(1−λ)cθt+1
]
+(1−η˜t)b−Θt (10)
where η˜t = η
C σu
σu + ηC
mt
nt
(11) where Θt = Etβ(1 − λ)(1 − pt+1) cqt+1
η˜t+1−η˜t
1−η˜t+1
Collective wage bargaining - Economy-wide bargaining
Wt − Ut
Wt − Ut + Jt
= η˜t (12) wt = η˜t
[
zt+Etβ(1−λ)cθt+1
]
+(1−η˜t)b−Θt (13)
where η˜t = η
C σu
σu + ηC(1 − σu)mtnt
(14) where Θt = Etβ(1 − λ)(1 − pt+1) cqt+1
η˜t+1−η˜t
1−η˜t+1
Note: ηC and ηI denote the union's bargaining power (under collective wage bargaining) and the
workers' bargaining power (under individual wage bargaining), respectively.
for ﬁrm-level and economy-wide wage negotiations, I can use either of the two
sets on results to illustrate the mechanisms at play, and this section focuses
on economy-wide wage negotiation. I will disentangle the two levels of wage
negotiation in Section 4 in which I carry out a quantitative assessment of the
model.
3.1 Countercyclical Worker Share
To better comprehend the properties of the worker share, I express Equation
(14) as a function of the beginning-of-period unemployment level, ut, and the
out-of-unemployment probability, pt. For
η˜t = η
C
σu(
1
ut
− 1 + pt)
σu(
1
ut
− 1) + (ηC(1− σu) + σu)pt
(15)
where the following properties hold (see Appendix C.4):
∂η˜t
∂pt
< 0
∂η˜t
∂ut
< 0
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The worker share is decreasing in the job-ﬁnding rate. Indeed, when the
labor market becomes tighter and unemployed workers face a higher probability
of ﬁnding a job, unions have a higher incentive to foster employment. Unions
are therefore willing to hold back wages by lowering the worker share to
encourage ﬁrms to post vacancies. Moreover, as unions are prone to prioritizing
employment when unemployment is high, the worker share is also decreasing in
the beginning-of-period unemployment level, a ﬁnding that is consistent with the
existing empirical literature.17 On impact, given that the beginning-of-period
unemployment level is predetermined, a productivity shock aﬀects the worker
share solely through its eﬀect on the job-ﬁnding rate. Consequently, the worker
share is countercyclical.
Examining the unions' maximization problem provides a deeper understand-
ing of the countercyclical property of the worker share. The unions' utility
function, Equation (8), is increasing in both wages and employment, and the
marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between them indicates the relative value
that unions assign to wages and employment. When the MRS of wages for
employment is high (low), unions are considered wage (employment) oriented.
Through its impact on wages and employment, a productivity shock alters the
unions' MRS, and therefore, the trade-oﬀ unions make between wages and
employment varies over the business cycle. The extent to which the MRS
increases depends on the relative increase in wages compared with the increase in
employment. A larger increase in wages compared to the increase in employment
is associated with a lower marginal utility of wages and a decrease in the MRS.
In this model, the wage rate reacts relatively more than the employment level,
a result that is common in the search and matching literature. Indeed, the
vacancy posting decision is motivated by the diﬀerence between the level of
productivity and the wage rate, and the reaction of employment is smoother
than that of the wage rate.18 Consequently, we obtain:
MRSwt,nt = −
∂nt
∂wt
=
∂Ωt
∂wt
∂Ωt
∂nt
=
1− ηC
cηC
∂mt
∂zt
[mt − σu(nt +mt)] < 0
under standard calibration. See Appendix C.5 for the full derivation.
After the shock, the decrease in the MRS means that an additional
increase in the employment level provides a higher level of utility than that
in the previous period, relative to an additional increase in the wage rate.
Therefore, the unions' preferences shift toward employment. This shift in
preferences explains why unions are willing to lower the worker share to
stimulate employment. Indeed, if the worker share were ﬁxed, the wage rate
would increase beyond its optimal level and would hinder vacancy postings.
Starting from the ﬁrst period after the productivity shock, an additional
(and opposite) mechanism is at play. A productivity shock occurring in period t
17See Aronsson, Löfgren, and Wikström (1993), Campbell (1997), and Calmfors, Booth,
Burda, Checchi, Naylor, and Visser (2001).
18This mechanism embodies Shimer's critique. See Shimer (2005).
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aﬀects the composition of unions, i.e., the proportion of (un)employed workers,
from period t + 1 onward. As stated in Equation (15), the worker share is
negatively correlated with the beginning-of-period unemployment level, and
this negative correlation opens a second channel through which shocks aﬀect
wage bargaining. Indeed, the heterogeneity of the unions' members introduces
political considerations and reﬂects the internal conﬂict within the unions. As
the positive shock propagates into the economy and lowers the proportion of
unemployed workers, unions become more willing to exert upward pressure on
wages by seizing a large portion of the total surplus.
Consequently, the unions' preferences and the consequent worker share
ﬂuctuate along the business cycle in the following manner. When a positive
productivity shock occurs, unions become, on impact, more employment
oriented. This shift in preferences translates into a decrease in the worker
share that endogenously creates wage rigidity. In the periods that follow, as
employment increases and as the wage rate returns to its steady state value,
the marginal utility of employment decreases and the marginal utility of the
wage rate increases, leading to a decrease of the MRS of employment for wages.
Unions therefore give higher importance to wages relative to employment as the
shock propagates in the economy, entailing a rapid return of the worker share
to its steady state level, a curtailment of the persistence of wages, and a raise
in the persistence of employment.
3.2 Wage Rigidity
The wage curves, Equation (13), demonstrates that the wage rate is driven by
two variables: the procyclical total match surplus and the countercyclical worker
share. The ﬂuctuation of the worker share, which is constant under individual
wage bargaining, is at the core of the wage rigidity mechanism under collective
bargaining. Indeed, the dynamics of the worker share partially counteracts the
dynamics of the total surplus and, consequently, dampens the wage ﬂuctuations.
My comments are twofold. First, the current model provides a micro-
foundation for wage rigidity. Collectively bargained wages are less responsive to
the business cycle because of the countercyclical property of the worker share, a
property that directly results from the unions' maximization problem. Second,
the nature of the wage rigidity observed here contrasts with that observed in
a part of the literature that models either constant wages or wages featuring
a backward-looking component, often with the aim of amplifying the volatility
of unemployment and vacancies and thus responding to Shimer's critique. For
instance, Hall (2005) and Shimer (2004) assume that wages do not ﬂuctuate with
the business cycle and that they are set at a constant socially acceptable level. In
Krause and Lubik (2007), the wage is a weighted average of the Nash bargained
wage and a wage norm. Gertler and Trigari (2009) introduce a staggered wage-
setting, in which a certain proportion of the contracts are renegotiated during
each period. In Blanchard and Gali (2007), Christoﬀel and Linzert (2010), and
Shimer (2010), the wage is a weighted average of the past wage level and a
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current equilibrium wage level.19 In the present paper, the wage rate ﬂuctuates
with the current productivity level, and it is not an explicit function of its past
value, i.e., it is not a state variable.
3.3 Countercyclical Union Wage Premium
The cyclical properties of the union wage premium directly result from the
relative rigidity of collectively bargained wages. Indeed, because individually
bargained wages are more cyclical than collectively bargained wages, the model
predicts that the union wage premium increases during downturns and dwindles
during upturns.
4 Quantitative Assessment of the Model
In this section, I investigate the quantitative properties of the model by studying
the impulse responses of the labor market to a positive productivity shock. To
do so, I consider a log-linear approximation of the equilibrium conditions as
stated in Appendix C.6.
4.1 Calibration
The calibration of the model is described in Table 2. To facilitate the comparison
between the two wage-setting processes and to identify the speciﬁc features of
collective wage bargaining, I calibrate the individual wage bargaining model to
match the empirical regularities of the U.S. and apply these calibrated parameter
values to the collective wage bargaining model.
I interpret a period as a month. The discount factor is set to 0.991/3, which
corresponds to a yearly interest rate of 4%, as commonly used in the macro-
RBC literature. I use quarterly data on real output and employment from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Major Sector Productivity program over
the 1955q1-2013q1 period. I construct labor productivity as the ratio of real
output to the employment level and normalize the mean of the series to one.
The productivity variable is then logged and de-trended by using an HP ﬁlter
with a smoothing parameter of 1600 to isolate the cyclical component of the
series. The log productivity level zt is assumed to follow an AR(1) process:
log(zt) = ρ log(zt−1) + t where  ∼ N(0, σ2). I ﬁt an autoregressive time series
model to the de-trended productivity data and obtain a persistence level of
0.7739 and a conditional standard deviation of 0.0082. At a monthly frequency,
the results are consistent with the setting ρ = 0.9181 and σ = 0.0052.
I target the probability p that an unemployed worker forms a match within
the period to 45%, implying an unemployment period of approximately two
months. This choice is consistent with Hall (2005) who estimates a monthly
19This current equilibrium wage level is the Nash bargained wage level in Christoﬀel and
Linzert (2010) and Shimer (2010) and the MRS between consumption and leisure in Blanchard
and Gali (2007).
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Table 2: Calibration
Description Parameter Value
Stochastic process for labor productivity
Autocorrelation ρ 0.91812
Standard deviation σ 0.00515
Mean labor productivity z 1 (normalization)
Common parameters
Discount rate β 0.991/3
Elasticity of m with respect to u σu 0.5
Unemployment income b¯ 0.8
Eﬃciency of the matching process σm 0.6364 set to target θ = 0.5
Vacancy posting cost c 0.3553 set to target p = 0.45
Separation rate λ 0.1/3
Individual wage bargaining
Workers' bargaining power ηI 0.5
Collective wage bargaining
Unions' bargaining power ηC 0.9
Note: Monthly calibration.
job ﬁnding rate of 0.48%, and is in line with the estimate of this rate presented
in Rogerson and Shimer (2011) for the U.S. for the 1948-2009 period. I also
target the degree of labor market tightness θ to 0.5, which is consistent with
the estimate of 0.539 obtained by Hall (2005). I set the probability that each
match ceases, λ, to 0.1/3. This value is within the broadly accepted range
of 8% − 10% proposed by Hall (2005) and is similar to Shimer's (2005) exit
probability estimate of 0.1/3 for the U.S.. In the baseline model, the separation
rates are identical across wage-setting processes; however, I check the robustness
of the results by using an alternative calibration for λ in the collective wage
bargaining model (Section 4.2.3).
Regarding the matching function, two parameters must be discussed. First,
the weight on unemployment σu, which represents both the elasticity of matches
with respect to unemployment and the elasticity of the vacancy ﬁlling rate with
respect to the labor market tightness, is set equal to 0.5. This value is consistent
with the range [0.5 − 0.7] proposed by Burda and Wyplosz (1994), based on
estimations of the matching function for certain western European countries.20
Second, σm is obtained from steady state calculations.
In contrast with the other parameters and targets, a debate regarding the
20See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a literature review on the estimation of the
matching function's parameters.
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value of non-work activity, b¯ = b/z, exists. The paper by Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008) revised this debate by proposing a new estimate for this value
of 0.95. Indeed, in contrast to Shimer (2005) who restricts the value of non-
work activity to the unemployment beneﬁts and sets b¯ equal to 0.4, Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008) additionally integrate home production and the value of
leisure. Delacroix (2006) also divides the unemployment income set at 0.6 into
a home production of 0.3 and unemployment beneﬁts of 0.3. To ensure that my
results are as plausible as possible, I choose an average value of 0.8.
In line with the literature, I set the value of the worker's bargaining power
to 0.5 to satisfy the Hosios condition and therefore to obtain an eﬃcient
decentralized equilibrium in the individual wage bargaining model.21 This
value is suggested by Mortensen (1994) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) to
ensure symmetry between workers and ﬁrms. The presence of unions is widely
acknowledged to increase the workers' bargaining power. Indeed, ﬁrms' fall back
payoﬀ is lower under collective wage bargaining because they would not produce
at all if disagreement arises. Given this observation, the unions' bargaining
power must be ﬁxed above 0.5. Additionally, if the unions' bargaining power
were also equal to 0.5, the steady state value of the wage rate obtained under
collective wage bargaining would be lower than that obtained under individual
wage bargaining. This result would contrast with the empirical literature that
identiﬁes a positive union wage premium.22 I set the unions' bargaining power
to 0.9 in the baseline calibration, and in Section 4.2.3, I check the implications
of alternative values for the model's dynamics.
The steady state of the model is shown in Table 3. Because unions have
higher bargaining power than individual workers, the steady state features a
small but positive union wage premium. Because the ﬁrms' value of a ﬁlled
vacancy decreases as the wage rate increases, vacancy postings are moderate
in the collective wage bargaining model, rendering the labor market more slack
and increasing both the unemployment rate and the unemployment duration.
Table 3: Steady State
Collective wage bargaining Individual wage bargaining
Wage 0.995 0.985
Vacancies 0.012 0.036
Unemployment rate 17.1% 7.1%
Unemployment duration 6m. 2.2m.
21See Hosios (1990).
22See for example Blanchﬂower and Bryson (2004).
17
4.2 Dynamics
In this section, I ﬁrst study the business cycle properties of the model by
analyzing the simulated moments and the impulse response functions generated
by the model. I set the economy-wide wage negotiation as the baseline level of
negotiation and compare the impulse response functions with the ones obtained
under ﬁrm-level wage negotiation. Next, I check the robustness of the results
for alternative values of the unions' bargaining power and the union separation
rate.
4.2.1 Moments
Table 4: Summary Statistics, Quarterly U.S. Data, 1955q1-2013q1
n u v θ w z
Standard deviation 0.016 0.120 0.135 0.249 0.009 0.013
Autocorrelation 0.921 0.900 0.899 0.903 0.686 0.770
Correlation n 1 −0.939 0.842 0.8985 0.0062 0.0452
u 1 −0.904 −0.964 −0.099 −0.227
v 1 0.982 0.162 0.411
θ 1 0.133 0.339
w 1 0.295
z 1
Notes: I construct labor productivity as the ratio of real output to the employment level. Real
output is the real gross domestic product in the non-farm business sector as published by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Employment is nonfarm
business employment taken from the Main Sector Productivity Costs program developed by
BLS. Data on the unemployment level and rate are taken from the BLS Current Population
Survey. Labor market tightness is constructed as the ratio of vacancies over unemployment,
where the vacancy series is constructed by merging data from the Conference Board, before
1995, with data from Barnichon (2010), after 1995. Wages are real hourly compensation
published by the BLS Main Sector Productivity Costs program. All series are logged and HP
ﬁltered with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
Table 4 provides an overview of the time-series behavior of several labor
market variables in the U.S. over the 1955-2013 period. Data on unemployment,
wages, and employment are taken from the Main Sector Productivity Costs
program and the Current Population Survey developed by the BLS. I construct
the vacancy series by using Barnichon (2010)'s methodology. I use the
Conference Board dataset until 1995 and substitute in the data constructed
by Barnichon for the later period. I construct labor productivity by dividing
the real output with the employment level, as explained in Section 4.1. I restrict
my analysis to the behavior of the labor market at business cycle frequencies
and abstract from factors that aﬀect the long-run evolution of the labor market,
such as changes in the education system or in demographics. Therefore, all
variables are logged and de-trended by using an HP ﬁlter with a smoothing
parameter of 1600.
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Table 5: Simulated Moments - Individual Wage Bargaining
n u v θ w z
Standard deviation 0.0021 0.0512 0.0404 0.0624 0.0114 0.0127
(0.0002) (0.0056) (0.0032) (0.0063) (0.0011) (0.0013)
Autocorrelation 0.8517 0.8520 0.5317 0.7555 0.7555 0.7560
(0.0294) (0.0295) (0.0724) (0.0456) (0.0457) (0.0458)
Correlation n 1 −0.9994 0.8618 0.9303 0.9674 0.9297
(0.0002) (0.0239) (0.0150) (0.0056) (0.0149)
u 1 −0.8615 −0.9301 −0.9683 −0.9303
(0.0238) (0.0150) (0.0058) (0.0151)
v 1 0.9489 0.7904 0.9484
(0.0062) (0.0379) (0.0061)
θ 1 0.8311 0.9996
(0.0327) (0.0001)
w 1 0.8315
(0.0329)
z 1
Notes: Simulated moments are average values over 200 simulations of a 182 period log-
linearized model of individual wage bargaining. The standard errors are shown in parentheses.
All variables are expressed in log-deviation from the steady state.
Tables 5 and 6 report the moments obtained by simulating the log-linearized
models of individual and collective wage bargaining, respectively. Speciﬁcally,
I simulate the log-linearized model with stochastic labor productivity and
generate 996 data points. I drop the ﬁrst 300 observations, and among the
remaining data points, I maintain one of three observations. Thus, I obtain
quarterly data points from simulating a monthly calibrated model. The number
of remaining data points corresponds to the length of the 1955q1-2013q1 period.
I repeat the simulation 200 times. The moments presented in the two tables are
average values and standard errors across model-generated observations.
The ﬁrst set of results concerns the volatility of the labor market. As Shimer
(2005) notes, individually Nash-bargained wages feature excessive volatility that
depresses the creation of vacancies. The standard deviations of employment
and market tightness that characterize the individual wage bargaining model
are eight and four times smaller, respectively, than the observed statistics. The
simulated moments presented in Table 6 indicate that the volatility of the labor
market is much larger when wages are collectively bargained than when wages
are individually bargained. The standard deviations of employment, vacancies
and market tightness are larger in the collective wage bargaining model than
in the individual wage bargaining model, and the volatility of these variables
increases as the union's bargaining power increases. For monopoly unions,
characterized by a union bargaining power of one, the standard deviations
of vacancies and market tightness exceed the observed values by 190% and
56%, respectively. Therefore, by considering both types of wage bargaining, the
simulated moments are closer to the observed labor market statistics. Indeed,
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Table 6: Simulated Moments - Collective Wage Bargaining
η = 0.9 n u v θ w z
Standard deviation 0.0046 0.0270 0.0508 0.0653 0.0122 0.0127
Autocorrelation 0.9168 0.9169 0.5225 0.6946 0.7620 0.7440
Correlation n 1 −0.9997 0.7822 0.9143 0.8900 0.9411
u 1 −0.7808 −0.9133 −0.8905 −0.9408
v 1 0.9600 0.7671 0.9305
θ 1 0.8175 0.9956
w 1 0.8207
z 1
η = 0.97 n u v θ w z
Standard deviation 0.0102 0.0246 0.1527 0.1576 0.0112 0.0127
Autocorrelation 0.8256 0.8257 0.0147 0.0842 0.8348 0.7440
Correlation n 1 −0.9996 0.4860 0.5866 0.9944 0.9041
u 1 −0.4838 −0.5845 −0.9953 −0.9039
v 1 0.9904 0.4773 0.5416
θ 1 0.5803 0.6525
w 1 0.9140
z 1
η = 1 n u v θ w z
Standard deviation 0.0118 0.0274 0.3922 0.3890 0.0186 0.0127
Autocorrelation 0.6716 0.6688 −0.1188 −0.1005 0.2690 0.7440
Correlation n 1 −0.9996 0.2544 0.2991 0.3248 0.7659
u 1 −0.2550 −0.2997 −0.3238 −0.7652
v 1 0.9981 0.0566 0.2582
θ 1 0.0955 0.3179
w 1 0.6266
z 1
Notes: Simulated moments are average values over 200 simulations of a 182 period log-
linearized model of collective wage bargaining. All variables are expressed in log-deviation
from the steady state. The standard errors are not reported because the order of magnitude
is very small (10−14).
averaging the standard deviations of the labor market tightness in both models,
by using the percentage of union coverage in the U.S. as weights, yields a
volatility of the labor market tightness of 0.121, which is half of the observed
volatility.23 In contrast, the individual wage bargaining model explains a quarter
of the labor market tightness statistics. Therefore, accounting for collective
wage bargaining greatly increases the performance of the model and partially
addresses Shimer's critique.
The diﬀerence in labor market volatilities across models stems from the
combined eﬀect of two mechanisms. First, as explained in Section 3.2, the
unions' behavior endogenously generates wage rigidity. Consequently, the ﬁrms'
surplus and therefore vacancies are more cyclically sensitive. Because the
countercyclical property of the worker share is at the core of this mechanism,
I refer to it as the worker share eﬀect of unions. Note that wages are more
rigid when unions have strong bargaining power. To understand how the union
bargaining power aﬀects the worker share eﬀect, I examine the log-linearized
23Over the 1977-2013 period, the average union coverage equals 18%. Source: union-
stats.com.
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equilibrium condition on the worker share:
ˆ˜ηt = −
(
γ(1− λ+ λ
p
)
)
uˆt −
(
γ(1− σu)(1− λ)
)
θˆt
where γ = η
C(1−σu)λ
ηC(1−σu)λ+σu and the hat operator denotes log-deviation from the
steady state. Because γ is increasing in ηC , the change in the worker share
resulting from a change in the labor market tightness increases as the unions'
bargaining power increases. Indeed, for high values of the unions' bargaining
power, wages would be more volatile if the worker share were ﬁxed. Therefore,
a positive shock encourages unions to be even more employment-oriented and
to substantially decrease the worker share. The positive shock thus leads to a
strong impulse in vacancy creation and to large volatility in the labor market.
Consequently, the worker share eﬀect increases with the unions' bargaining
power.
Second, because unions have stronger bargaining power than individual
workers, the labor market is more volatile when wages are collectively bargained.
As argued by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), the size of the percentage change
in the ﬁrms' surplus in response to a shock generates the ﬁrms' incentive to post
vacancies. Percentage changes are negatively correlated with the steady-state
value of the ﬁrms' surplus. Therefore, through its eﬀect on wages, a strong
unions' bargaining power reduces the ﬁrms' surplus. Consequently, stronger
union bargaining power is associated with larger percentage changes in the ﬁrms'
surplus and a greater incentive for the ﬁrms to post vacancies. This mechanism
builds on the diﬀerence in steady states that results from the diﬀerence in
bargaining power between unions and workers. Hence, I refer to this mechanism
as the steady-state eﬀect of unions. By deﬁnition, I expect the steady-state eﬀect
of unions to increase with the unions' bargaining power. In the next section,
the analysis of the impulse-response functions will enable me to quantitatively
disentangle the worker share eﬀect from the steady-state eﬀect of unions on the
labor market volatility.
Table 6 shows that the relationship between wage volatility and the unions'
bargaining power is not linear. Such nonlinearity arises because, although wages
are rigid on impact, they are also more persistent, as discussed in Section 3.1.
The total eﬀect on wage volatility depends on the relative strength of these
two opposite forces. Here, the analysis of the impulse responses that will be
conducted in the next section will allow me to observe the rigidity of wages on
impact and their persistence over time.
Regarding the autocorrelations, I observe that employment, vacancies, and
market tightness are less persistent for higher values of the unions' bargaining
power but that the autocorrelation measures do not match the observed
statistics.
Finally, regarding the empirical correlations, the negative correlation be-
tween unemployment and vacancies, i.e., the Beveridge curve, appears to be
too strong in the individual bargaining model relative to the observed statistics.
This correlation decreases, in absolute terms, in the collective bargaining model,
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suggesting that including collective bargaining in the analysis improves the ﬁt of
the model. The risk, however, is that the correlation will be undervalued if the
weight on collective bargaining, e.g., the union coverage, is too large or if the
unions' bargaining power is too high. Finally, the correlations between wages
and the other labor market variables in the case of union monopoly indicate that
considering collective wage bargaining brings the simulated moments closer to
the data. In particular, wages are less correlated with the unemployment rate,
market tightness, and labor productivity when wages are collectively bargaining
than when wages are individually bargained. However, this result should be
considered with caution because the relationship between the correlation values
and the unions' bargaining power is not linear.
4.2.2 Impulse Responses to Productivity
Economy-wide wage negotiation. As explained in the previous section, the
diﬀerence in labor market dynamics across the models is explained by both the
worker share eﬀect and the steady state eﬀect of unions. To assess the relative
importance of these two eﬀects on the labor market dynamics, I introduce an
intermediate case that is characterized by (a) individual wage bargaining and
(b) high worker bargaining power such that the steady state is identical to the
steady state prevailing in the collective wage bargaining model. Figure 1 shows
the response of the labor market to a positive productivity shock of one standard
deviation. The dynamics of the collective wage bargaining model is represented
by the plain line. I also report the dynamics of the individual wage bargaining
model (dashed line) and of the intermediate model (dotted line) to be able to
quantitatively assess the relative importance of the two eﬀects.
By construction, the diﬀerence between the dashed line (individual wage
bargaining) and the dotted line (intermediate model) captures the steady-state
eﬀect of unions. As explained in the previous section, an increase in the
bargaining power modiﬁes the steady state and aﬀects the dynamics of the
model. Speciﬁcally, in the intermediate model, the strong bargaining power
of the workers pushes wages up and, through this channel, reduces the ﬁrms'
surplus, in the steady state. Consequently, when the economy experiences a
positive productivity shock, the percentage change in the ﬁrms' surplus is larger,
and so is the ﬁrms' incentive to post vacancies. Therefore, in the intermediate
model, although wages show a greater reaction to the shock, employment is
more volatile.
The worker share eﬀect of unions entirely accounts for the gap between the
plain line (collective wage bargaining) and the dotted line (intermediate model).
This eﬀect derives from the countercyclical worker share that characterizes
collective wage bargaining. On impact, unions lower the worker share and,
through this channel, slightly decreases the volatility of wages. Indeed, the
dashed line lies below the dotted line, which indicates that collective wages are
more rigid on impact. Because wages are less reactive to the shock, ﬁrms gain an
extra surplus and react by posting more vacancies. Consequently, the reaction
of labor market tightness and employment is stronger. As the shock propagates
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in the economy and as employment increases, more employed workers call for
high-level wages, which results in a change in the unions' preferences. As unions
become more wage-oriented, they progressively engage into a more aggressive
wage policy by boosting the worker share, which slows down the wage reversion
toward its steady-state level. Moreover, because the worker share eﬀect increases
the persistence of wages, the ﬁrms' surplus, the vacancies, and the employment
rate feature less persistence.
Figure 1 shows that the worker share eﬀect of unions almost entirely explains
the extra volatility of labor market tightness featured in the collective wage
bargaining model. Additionally, the worker share eﬀect accounts for most of
the extra volatility of employment in the ﬁrst periods after the shock, and as
the shock propagates into the economy, its relative importance decreases in favor
of the steady-state eﬀect of unions.
Firm-level wage negotiation. Figure 2 compares economy-wide collective
wage bargaining with ﬁrm level wage bargaining. When unions are too small
to inﬂuence the hiring rate, they abstract from the positive eﬀect that wages
have on the vacancy ﬁlling rate and overestimate the negative wage eﬀect on
employment. As a result, they are more reluctant to push for higher wages and
the countercyclicality of the worker share is strengthened. Consequently, wages
are more rigid and employment ﬂuctuations are larger. This result therefore
suggests that wage rigidity depends negatively on the degree of centralization
of collective bargaining.
4.2.3 Robustness
The value of the unions' bargaining power. Given the lack of evidence
for identifying the value of the unions' bargaining power, I analyze the response
of the labor market under three possible values of ηC : ηC = 0.8, ηC = 0.9
(baseline calibration), and ηC = 1 (monopoly union). Figure 3 shows how
the worker share, wages, the labor market tightness, and the employment rate
respond to a positive productivity shock. I observe that the worker share eﬀect
of unions increases as the unions' bargaining power increases. Indeed, although
the worker share eﬀect is negligible for low values of ηC , it is salient in the case of
monopoly unions. For high values of the unions' bargaining power, wages would
greatly increase if the worker share were ﬁxed, and a positive shock therefore
induces unions to prioritize employment. The consequent decrease in the worker
share leads to a strong response of vacancy creation and labor market tightness.
Therefore, this result conﬁrms the theoretical prediction (Section 4.2.1) that the
worker share eﬀect increases with the unions' bargaining power.
The value of λ. The empirical literature presents evidence that the separation
rate is lower in highly unionized sectors.24 To be in line with this strand of
24For example, Freeman (1980) shows that in the U.S., tenure is greater for workers who
are covered by union contracts and that the probability of their match ceasing is lower. Knight
and Latreille (2000) and Antcliﬀ and Saundry (2009) ﬁnd similar results for the U.K.
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research, I study the case in which the separation rate is 20% lower in the
collective wage-bargaining model (λC = 0.08/3) compared with the individual
wage bargaining model (in which I maintain λI = 0.1/3).
As shown in Figure 4, the worker share eﬀect is not substantially modiﬁed
by the alternative calibration. The decrease in the separation rate dampens
the volatility of the worker share; however the overall eﬀect on the wage
and employment dynamics is small. Furthermore, the alternative calibration
modiﬁes the steady state eﬀect. When the exit rate is low, ﬁrms beneﬁt from
a larger surplus in the steady state, and a shock therefore leads to smaller
percentage changes in the ﬁrms' surplus. Consequently, the ﬁrms' incentive to
post vacancies is lower, which explains the moderate increase in employment.
5 Extension: Insiders vs. Outsiders
The unions' utility function presented in Equation 8 also uncovers the clash of
interests between employed and unemployed workers and allows us to analyze
the unions' strategy through the lens of the outsider-insider literature. Insiders,
i.e. employed workers, push for higher wages because it directly increases their
utility. Outsiders, i.e. unemployed workers, lobby for lower worker share, so as
to give incentive to ﬁrms to post vacancies. Here, I open a new channel through
which wages aﬀect the workers' surplus. Speciﬁcally, workers, and therefore
unions, now take into account the following mechanism: high wages, by lowering
employment, trigger a higher unemployment rate next period that reduces the
future probability for unemployed workers to ﬁnd jobs and increases the future
surplus of employed workers. Therefore, by lowering the future job-ﬁnding rate,
an increase in wages greatly beneﬁts insiders. Under this new assumption, the
labor share is (See Appendix D for the derivation):
Wt − Ut
Wt − Ut + Jt =
ηCσu(1 + ψt)
σu + ηCσuψt + ηC(1− σu)mtnt
(16)
where ψt = β(1 − λ)2 (1−σu)
2
σu
pt+1
ut+1
mt
Jt
(Wt+1 − Ut+1). This new channel
increases the unions' marginal utility of wages and lowers the countercyclicality
of the worker share. The impulse responses presented in Figure 5 conﬁrm that,
when unions take into account the wage eﬀect on the future surplus of workers,
the worker share is more rigid, wages are more cyclical, and employment's
ﬂuctuations are dampened.
6 Concluding Remarks
By modeling collective wage bargaining in a search and matching framework,
I develop a tractable model of the labor market that enables me to investigate
how labor unions aﬀect labor market dynamics. In the traditional search and
matching literature, wages typically ﬂuctuate with the total match value. I
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show that when wages are collectively bargained, a second source of wage
volatility arises: the worker share ﬂuctuates countercyclically, dampening wage
ﬂuctuations. The model predicts that when the economy experiences a positive
productivity shock, employment-oriented unions react by reducing the worker
share and, hence, by moderating the wage increase. The model therefore
explains and provides a micro-foundation of the rigidity of wages, and I show
that this rigidity, in turn, ampliﬁes the response of employment and labor market
tightness. Moreover, I demonstrate the reversal of the unions' preference as the
shock propagates in the economy and increases the employment level. The
change in the composition of unions in favor of employed workers encourages
unions to be more wage-oriented and to seize a larger portion of the total match
surplus. Consequently, wages are more persistent when they are collectively
bargained than when they are individually bargained. The dynamics of the
labor market also results from the higher bargaining power of unions compared
to the one of individual workers. The analysis of the impulse-response functions
allows me to quantitatively assess the relative importance of these two eﬀects.
The results indicate that the countercyclical adjustment of the worker share is
the main source of the additional volatility of the labor market in the collective
wage bargaining model, and that this eﬀect is larger when the unions' bargaining
power is stronger.
The model presented in this paper represents an improvement over the
current literature by bringing together two strands of research, as it improves our
theoretical understanding of the sources of wage and employment volatility as
well as the role of labor unions in shaping these volatilities. Moreover, including
collective wage bargaining improves the ﬁt of the search and matching model
and partially addresses Shimer's critique. Finally, this paper provides a rationale
for two empirical regularities: the observed countercyclicality of the union wage
premium and the negative correlation between the unions' ability to raise wages
and the level of unemployment.
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A Optimality Conditions under Individual Wage
Bargaining
A.1 Vacancy Posting Decision under Individual Wage
Bargaining
Under individual wage bargaining, although wages are bargained once the
employment level is determined, ﬁrms anticipate the outcome of the wage
bargaining when deciding on the number of vacancies to post. With this
timing, if wages in a ﬁrm would depend on this ﬁrm's employment size, the ﬁrm
would have the possibility to modulate the wage through its employment policy.
For simplicity reason, I assume constant returns to scale in the production
function so that the intra-ﬁrm bargaining element vanishes.25 As a result, the
proﬁt's maximization is not constrained by the wage equation wt = wt(nt) and
the number of posted vacancies results from the following proﬁt maximization
process:
max
vt
Ft(nt) = ztnt − wtnt − cvt + EtβFt+1(nt+1)
s.t. nt = (1− λ)nt−1 + qtvt
which is identical to the case of collective wage bargaining. Therefore, under
both wage-setting processes, the job creation curve is described by Equation
(5).
A.2 Wage Negotiation under Individual Bargaining
Once the match is formed, the individual wage bargaining process takes place
between the ﬁrm and the worker. The Nash-bargained wage maximizes the
product of the net gains of agreement for both parties:
max
wt
[Wt − Ut]ηI [Jt]1−ηI
where ηI ∈ [0, 1] is the workers' bargaining power.
The ﬁrst-order condition states that the worker share of the total surplus is
equal to the workers' bargaining power:
Wt − Ut
Wt − Ut + Jt = η
I
By rearranging this ﬁrst-order condition and using the expression of the
values Jt, Wt and Ut, I obtain the equilibrium wage equation:
wt = η
I [zt + Etβ(1− λ)cθt+1(zt+1)] + (1− ηI)b
The bargaining set is delimited by two threat points and contains an inﬁnity
of equilibrium wage rates. The optimal sharing rule allocates a constant share
of the bargaining set to the worker and the ﬁrm.
25See Cahuc and Wasmer (2001).
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B Proﬁt of the Firms and Marginal Value of
Employment
The ﬁrms' proﬁt satisﬁes the following Bellman equation:
Ft = ztnt − wtnt − cvt + EtβFt+1
The Bellman equation of the ﬁrms' marginal value of employment is:
Jt = zt − wt + Etβ(1− λ)Jt+1
Therefore:
Ft = ntJt − ntEtβ(1− λ)Jt+1 − cvt
+ Etβ[nt+1Jt+1 − nt+1Etβ(1− λ)Jt+2 − cvt+1]
+ Etβ
2[nt+2Jt+2 − nt+2Etβ(1− λ)Jt+3 − cvt+2] + Etβ3...
Using the law of motion of employment, nt+1 = (1− λ)nt + qt+1vt+1, I obtain:
Ft = ntJt − cvt
+ Etβ[nt+1Jt+1 − nt+1Jt+1 − cvt+1 + qt+1vt+1Jt+1]
+ Etβ
2[nt+2Jt+2 − nt+2Jt+2 − cvt+2 + qt+2vt+2Jt+2] + Etβ3...
Because Jt =
c
qt
, I get:
Ft = ntJt − cvt + Etβ[−cvt+1 + cvt+1] + Etβ2[−cvt+2 + cvt+2] + Etβ3...
Ft = ntJt − cvt (17)
C Equilibrium Wage under Collective Wage Bar-
gaining
C.1 Worker Share under Firm-Level Collective Wage
Bargaining
The union's maximization program is the following:
max
wt
[nt(Wt − Ut)]ηC [Ft]1−ηC
s.t job creation equation:
c
qt
= zt − wt + Etβ(1− λ) c
qt+1
Plugging the job creation curve, Equation (5), and the Bellman equation for
the ﬁrms' ex-post employment value of marginal match, Jt, into Equation (17),
we obtain Ft = (1 − λ)nt−1Jt. Using this equation, we obtain the following
F.O.C. of the maximization program:
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ηC [
∂nt
∂wt
(Wt−Ut)+nt ∂Wt
∂wt
](1−λ)nt−1Jt+(1−ηC)(1−λ)nt−1 ∂Jt
∂wt
[nt(Wt−Ut)] = 0
The law of motion of employment is nt = 1− ut + qtvt. In case of ﬁrm-level
negotiation, unions are too small to inﬂuence the market, therefore, using (5),
we obtain:
∂nt
∂wt
= − mt
σuJt
Using this derivative, the F.O.C. can be rewritten as:
−ηC mt
σuJt
(Wt − Ut)Jt + ηCntJt = (1− ηC)nt(Wt − Ut)
Rearranging leads to:
Wt − Ut = η
Cσu
σu(1− ηC) + ηC mtnt
Jt
and
Wt − Ut
Wt − Ut + Jt =
ηCσu
σu + ηC
mt
nt
which is equivalent to Equation (9).
C.2 Worker Share under Economy-Wide Collective Wage
Bargaining
The maximization program and F.O.C. are identical to the case of ﬁrm-level
wage bargaining:
ηC [
∂nt
∂wt
(Wt−Ut)+nt ∂Wt
∂wt
](1−λ)nt−1Jt+(1−ηC)(1−λ)nt−1 ∂Jt
∂wt
[nt(Wt−Ut)] = 0
The law of motion of employment is nt = 1− ut + qtvt. In case of economy-
wide wage negotiation, unions internalize the wage eﬀect on the vacancy ﬁlling
rate. Therefore, using (5), we obtain:
∂nt
∂wt
= − (1− σu)mt
σuJt
Using this derivative, the F.O.C. can be rewritten as:
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−ηC (1− σu)mt
σuJt
(Wt − Ut)Jt + ηCntJt = (1− ηC)nt(Wt − Ut)
Rearranging leads to:
Wt − Ut = η
Cσu
σu(1− ηC) + ηC(1− σu)mtnt
Jt
and
Wt − Ut
Wt − Ut + Jt =
ηCσu
σu + ηC(1− σu)mtnt
which is equivalent to Equation (12).
C.3 Wage Curve under Collective Wage Bargaining
The functional form of the wage curve is independent of the level of wage
bargaining (ﬁrm level or economy-wide).
Plugging the workers' value functions of employment and unemployment,
Equations (6) and (7), into each other, I obtain:
Wt − Ut = wt − b+ Et(1− λ)β(1− pt+1)(Wt+1 − Ut+1)
Using the equilibrium condition (9), we can rewrite this equation as:
ηCσu
σu(1− ηC) + ηC(1− σu)mtnt
Jt = wt−b+Et(1−λ)β(1−pt+1) η
Cσu
σu(1− ηC) + ηC(1− σu)mt+1nt+1
Jt+1
Plugging the value of ﬁrms' value function of employment into this equation,
I get:
ηCσu
σu(1− ηC) + ηC(1− σu)mtnt
(zt − wt + Etβ(1− λ) c
qt+1
)
= wt − b+ Et(1− λ)β(1− pt+1) η
Cσu
σu(1− ηC) + ηC(1− σu)mt+1nt+1
c
qt+1
Rearranging leads to:
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wt =
ηCσu
σu + η(1− σu)mtnt
[
zt + Etβ(1− λ) c
qt+1
]
+
σu(1− ηC) + ηC(1− σu)mtnt
σu + ηC(1− σu)mtnt
[
b−Et(1−λ)β(1−pt+1) η
Cσu
σu(1− ηC) + ηC(1− σu)mt+1nt+1
c
qt+1
]
wt = η˜t
[
zt+Etβ(1−λ) c
qt+1
]
+(1−η˜t)
[
b−Etβ(1−λ)(1−pt+1) η˜t+1
1− η˜t+1
c
qt+1
]
where η˜t is deﬁned by Equation (14).
wt = η˜t
[
zt+Etβ(1−λ)cθt+1
]
+(1−η˜t)b−
[
Etβ(1−λ) c
qt+1
(1−pt+1)
][ η˜t+1 − η˜t
1− η˜t+1
]
This is equivalent to Equation (13). A similar method can be applied to
obtain Equations (11) and (10).
C.4 Cyclical Properties of the Worker Share
The derivative of the worker share with respect to the job ﬁnding rate is:
∂η˜t
∂pt
= ηC
σu[σu(
1
ut
− 1) + (η(1− σu) + σu)pt]− (ηC(1− σu) + σu)σu( 1ut − 1 + pt)
(σu(
1
ut
− 1) + (ηC(1− σu) + σu)pt)2
∂η˜t
∂pt
= −ηC η
C(1− σu)σu( 1ut − 1)
(σu(
1
ut
− 1) + (ηC(1− σu) + σu)pt)2
< 0
The derivative of the worker share with respect to the beginning-of-period
stock of unemployed workers is:
∂η˜t
∂ut
= ηC
−σu
u2t
[σu(
1
ut
− 1) + (ηC(1− σu) + σu)pt] + σuu2t (σu(
1
ut
− 1 + pt))
(σu(
1
ut
− 1) + (ηC(1− σu) + σu)pt)2
∂η˜t
∂ut
= ηC
−σu
u2t
ηC(1− σu)
(σu(
1
ut
− 1) + (ηC(1− σu) + σu)pt)2
< 0
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C.5 Marginal Rate of Substitution of Wage for Employ-
ment
MRSwt,nt = −
∂nt
∂wt
=
∂Ωt
∂wt
∂Ωt
∂nt
MRSwt,nt = −
(1− σu)mt
σuJt
+
nt
Wt − Ut
Using Wt − Ut = η˜t1−η˜t Jt, we get:
MRSwt,nt =
1
Jt
[
1− η˜t
η˜t
nt − (1− σu)mt
σu
]
MRSwt,nt =
qt
c
[
nt(1− ηC)σu + ηC(1− σu)mt
ηCσu
− (1− σu)mt
σu
]
MRSwt,nt =
1− ηC
ηC
ntqt
c
∂MRSwUt ,nUt
∂zt
=
1− ηC
cηC
[
∂nt
∂zt
qt +
∂qt
∂zt
nt]
∂MRSwUt ,nUt
∂zt
=
1− ηC
cηC
[
∂mt
∂zt
qt +
∂mt
∂zt
nt
vt
− ∂vt
∂zt
qtnt
vt
]
∂MRSwUt ,nUt
∂zt
=
1− ηC
cηC
∂mt
∂zt
[mt − σu(nt +mt)] < 0
because mt − σu(nt +mt) < 0 under standard calibration.
C.6 Linearization
In order to analyze the channels through which the productivity shock aﬀects
the labor market, I consider a log-linear approximation of the equilibrium
conditions (Equations (5), (13) and (15)), of the laws of motion of employment
and unemployment, and of the equations deﬁning matches, vacancy ﬁlling rate,
job ﬁnding rate, and labor market tightness. The hat operator denotes log-
deviation from the steady state.
• (End-of-period) employment dynamics:
nˆt = −λ
p
uˆt + λmˆt
• (Beginning-of-period) unemployment dynamics:
uˆt = − p
λ
(1− λ)nˆt−1
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Using these two equations, I can write:
nˆt = (1− λ)nˆt−1 + λmˆt
• Matching process:
mˆt = σuuˆt + (1− σu)vˆt
• Vacancy ﬁlling rate:
qˆt = mˆt − vˆt
• Job ﬁnding rate:
pˆt = mˆt − uˆt
• Labor market tightness:
θˆt = vˆt − uˆt
• JC curve:
θˆt = φzˆt − φw¯wˆt + β(1− λ)θˆt+1
where w¯ = wz , φ =
1
σuC
and C = czq .
• Wage rate:
Individual wage bargaining:
wˆt =
ηI
w¯
zˆt +
ηI
w¯
[
β(1− λ)c¯θ]θˆt+1
Collective wage bargaining:
wˆt =
η˜
w¯
zˆt +
η˜
w¯
[
β(1− λ)c¯θ]θˆt+1 + η˜
w¯
[
(1− b¯) + β(1− λ)c¯θ]ˆ˜ηt + ˆ˜Ot
where ˆ˜Ot =
1
w¯
[
β(1− λ)C(1− p) η˜1−η˜
]
(ˆ˜ηt − ˆ˜ηt+1)
and b¯ = bz , c¯ =
c
z and C =
c
zq .
• Worker share (for collective wage bargaining):
ˆ˜ηt = −
(
γ(1− λ+ λ
p
)
)
uˆt −
(
γ(1− σu)(1− λ)
)
θˆt
where γ = η
C(1−σu)λ
ηC(1−σu)λ+σu .
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D Extension: Insider vs. Outsider
The maximization program is identical to the case of ﬁrm-level and economy-
level wage bargaining:
max
wt
[nt(Wt − Ut)]ηC [Ft]1−ηC
s.t job creation equation:
c
qt
= zt − wt + Etβ(1− λ) c
qt+1
Plugging the job creation curve, Equation (5) and the Bellman equation for
the ﬁrms' ex-post employment value of marginal match, Jt, into Equation (17),
one obtains Ft = (1 − λ)nt−1Jt. Using this equation, we obtain the following
F.O.C. of the maximization program:
ηC [
∂nt
∂wt
(Wt−Ut)+nt ∂Wt
∂wt
](1−λ)nt−1Jt+(1−ηC)(1−λ)nt−1 ∂Jt
∂wt
[nt(Wt−Ut)] = 0
Using the law of motion of employment and the job creation curve, Equation
(5), we obtain:
∂nt
∂wt
= − (1− σu)mt
σuJt
In this extension, unions internalize how a change in wages in time t will
aﬀect the job ﬁnding rate in time t + 1 and, through this channel, how it will
aﬀect the worker surplus in t+ 1. Therefore:
∂Wt
∂wt
= 1 + ψt
where ψt = β(1− λ)2 (1−σu)
2
σu
pt+1
ut+1
mt
Jt
(Wt+1 − Ut+1).
Using these derivatives, the F.O.C. of the maximization program is:
−ηC mt
σuJt
(Wt − Ut)Jt + ηCnt(1 + ψt)Jt = (1− ηC)nt(Wt − Ut)
Rearranging leads to:
Wt − Ut = η
Cσu(1 + ψt)
σu(1− ηC) + ηC(1− σu)mtnt
Jt
and
Wt − Ut
Wt − Ut + Jt =
ηCσu(1 + ψt)
σu + ηCσuψt + ηC(1− σu)mtnt
which is equivalent to Equation (16).
37
Figure 1: Impulse Responses of the Labor Market to a Positive Productivity
Shock
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Collective wage bargaining Individual wage bargaining Intermediate model
Note: Percentage deviation from the steady state following a positive productivity
shock of one standard deviation. The intermediate model is characterized by (a)
individual wage bargaining and (b) high worker bargaining power such that the steady
state is identical to the steady state prevailing in the collective wage bargaining model.
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses of the Labor Market to a Positive Productivity
Shock
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Note: Percentage deviation from the steady state following a positive productivity
shock of one standard deviation.
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Figure 3: Alternative Values of the Union's Bargaining Power
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Collective wage bargaining Individual wage bargaining Intermediate model
Note: Percentage deviation from the steady state following a positive productivity
shock of one standard deviation. The intermediate model is characterized by (a)
individual wage bargaining and (b) high worker bargaining power such that the steady
state is identical to the steady state prevailing in the collective wage bargaining model.
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Figure 4: Alternative Value of the Union Separation Rate
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Collective wage bargaining Individual wage bargaining Intermediate model
Note: Percentage deviation from the steady state following a positive productivity
shock of one standard deviation. I maintain the separation rate equal to λI = 0.1/3
in the individual wage-bargaining model and show the eﬀect of a 20-percent decrease
in the separation rate in the collective wage bargaining model (λC = 0.08/3). The
intermediate model is characterized by (a) individual wage bargaining and (b) high
worker bargaining power and a low separation rate such that the steady state is
identical to the steady state prevailing in the collective wage bargaining model.
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses of the Labor Market to a Positive Productivity
Shock
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Note: Percentage deviation from the steady state following a positive productivity
shock of one standard deviation. Workers, and therefore unions, now take into account
that high wages, by lowering the future probability for unemployed workers to ﬁnd jobs,
increase the future surplus of employed workers.
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